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DETERMINANTS OF CITATIONS TO ARTICLES
IN ELITE LAW REVIEWS
IAN AYRES and FREDRICK E. VARS*
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the determinants of citations to pieces published from 1980
to 1995 in Harvard Law Review, Stanford Law Review, and The Yale Law Journal.
We also rank articles by number of citations using regressions controlling for time
since publication, journal, and subject area. To summarize a few of our results: cita-
tions per year peak at 4 years after publication, and an article receives half of its
expected total lifetime citations after 4.6 years; appearing first in an issue is a sig-
nificant advantage; international law articles receive fewer citations; jurisprudence
articles are cited more often; articles by young, female, or minority authors are
more heavily cited. Articles with shorter titles, fewer footnotes per page, and with-
out equations have significantly more citations than other articles. Total citations
generally increase with an article's length, but citations per published page peak at
53 pages.
I. INTRODUCTION
MANY legal citation studies have two shortcomings-they tend to focus
too much on only the right-hand tail of the citation distribution and too little
on the determinants of citation. The emphasis on the right-hand tail can be
observed most clearly in Fred Shapiro's piece, "The Most-Cited Law Re-
view Articles,"' which marked the path for later studies.2 This fight-tail
* Townsend Professor, Yale Law School, and J.D., Yale Law School, respectively. For
helpful comments, the authors thank John Donahue, Ted Eisenberg, William Landes, Jim
Lindgren, Peter Siegelman, David Steglich, Charles Vars, participants at the AALS law and
economics section, and participants at the Interpreting Legal Citations symposium.
See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1540 (1985).
2 See, for example, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Heavily Cited Articles in
Law, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 825 (1996); Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and
Scholars: Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles? 71 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 871 (1996); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited,
71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 751 (1996) (hereinafter Shapiro, Revisited); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-
Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 Yale L. J. 1449 (1991). At least one other
commentator has noted this bias. See Nancy Levit, Defining Cutting-Edge Scholarship: Femi-
nism and Criteria of Rationality, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 947, 952 (1996) ("[P]erhaps the direc-
tion of quantitative inquiry is fundamentally wrong. We might learn more about scholarship
and the politics of the legal academy if we explore instead what works are not being cited
and why").
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXIX (January 2000)]
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bias is not unique to studies of law review articles. A recent study in this
journal ranked the top 32 law schools on the basis of citations to articles
written by professors at each of the law schools.' There have, however,
been exceptions to the right-tail bias in legal citations analysis. A pair of
articles examined citations to judicial opinions in order to identify the least
significant United States Supreme Court justice.4 And a sophisticated analy-
sis of citations to opinions by judges on the federal courts of appeals in-
cluded a complete ranking of the entire distribution of judges.' Notably
missing from the literature is a comparable examination of the full distribu-
tion of law review articles (including the least cited).
Prior studies have also failed to delve very seriously into the determi-
nants of citations. Studies of law review articles' citations have recognized
the importance of opportunities to be cited but employ relatively crude sta-
tistical methods to correct for this effect. For example, in response to the
age-of-article criticism of his all-time 100 most-cited articles' list, Shapiro
added top-10 lists for articles published in each year from 1982 to 1991.6
This methodology, however, does not allow for the simultaneous consider-
ation of other variables.7 A more sophisticated statistical approach is that
of William Landes and Richard Posner, who recreated Shapiro's top-100
rankings, adjusting for the effects of article age and age squared.' Landes
and Posner, however, did not correct for journal and subject area effects,
which may influence opportunities to be cited. More fundamental, because
they relied solely on cross-sectional data, Landes and Posner could not
model the flow of citations over time or isolate the effects of changes in the
' See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly Im-
pact of Law Schools, 27 J. Legal Stud. 373 (1998). See also James Lindgren & Daniel Selt-
zer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Faculties, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 781, 786 (1996)
(ranking law school professors by the number of articles published in the 10 and 20 most-
cited law reviews). Richard Posner has used citation analysis to examine the impact of Benja-
min Cardozo and Learned Hand. See Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study of Reputation
(1990); Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Great-
ness, 104 Yale L. J. 511 (1994) (reviewing Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and
the Judge (1994)).
' See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 481 (1983); David Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50
U. Chi. L. Rev. 466 (1983). Easterbrook argues that Thomas Todd was less significant than
Gabriel Duval[l].
' See William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence:
A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. Legal Stud. 271 (1998). Con-
sistent with the right-tall bias, however, much of the discussion centers on the most influen-
tial judges.
6 See Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 2, at 773-77 (table 2).
This criticism applies generally to Shapiro's comparisons between articles on his all-time
and recent-year lists. See id. at 757-58.
8 See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 830-31.
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size of the data source.9 And, to our knowledge, no prior studies have re-
gressed article citations on a richer set of article and author attributes.
These two shortcomings are related because focusing on the "most
cited" can obscure researchers' ability to identify the determinants of cita-
tions more generally. Steven Jay Gould, for example, pointed out that fo-
cusing solely on the decline of the .400 hitter in baseball led people to over-
look explanations concerning the overall range of variation. ° With regard
to legal citations, it is at least plausible to argue that, among articles in elite
law reviews, receiving few citations is a stronger indicator of relative qual-
ity than receiving many. Articles with many citations might be high quality
or low quality (as other authors go out of their way to criticize the argu-
ment). Articles in elite law reviews with few citations, however, are more
likely to be of low quality. Finding that a Harvard Law Review article has
many fewer cites than other articles in the same subject area is hard to
square with a hypothesis of excellence."
The data in our study consist of 979 articles and other nonstudent pieces
published in Harvard Law Review, Stanford Law Review, and The Yale Law
Journal from 1980 to 1995.12 We use these data to make three types of esti-
mates:
Residual Rankings. Regressing article citations onto variables correlated
with the opportunities the article had for citation (but independent of its
quality), we rank the articles by how far their actual citations are above or
below their expected citations (taking only opportunity variables into ac-
count). With some trepidation, we then list the most- and least-cited articles
in our sample on the basis of these residual rankings.
Article and Author Attribute Regressions. By collecting panel data on
the annual citations to particular articles, we are able to disentangle the
expansion of our database, the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), from
the general tendencies of articles to be cited over time. We regress annual
article citations on more than 60 regressors for article and author attributes.
Least-Cited Article Regressions. Returning to our residual rankings, we
Some analyses of citations in areas other than law review articles employ more sophisti-
cated statistical methodologies. For two of the best examples, see Landes, Lessig, & Soli-
mine, supra note 5, and Eisenberg & Wells, supra note 3.
'0 See Steven Jay Gould, The Flamingo's Smile 218-21 (1985).
" Others have noted more general problems with inferring high quality from large citation
counts. See, for example, Posner, Cardozo, supra note 3, at 70-73.
12 We selected these three journals because these are generally considered to be the top
three student-edited legal publications. Shapiro reports that these three journals published
more of the most-cited articles from 1982 to 1991 than any other journal. See Shapiro, Revis-
ited, supra note 2, at 763. The Appendix provides a more complete description of the SSCI
database as well as the data we collected on article and author attributes.
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explore which attributes were most associated with an article receiving few
citations.
While this article marks a slight methodological advance over previous
studies, there is no sense of triumph on our part. Identification problems
plague all of our regressions. When we find that a particular attribute is
positively correlated with citations to an article, should we conclude that
(a) articles with this attribute have higher than average quality, (b) law re-
view editors discriminate against articles with this attribute (demanding
above average quality before publishing), or (c) subsequent authors discrim-
inate in favor of citing this type of article (in the sense of citing to it more
than its intrinsic merit deserves)? To this important question, our data speak
not. And while we have criticized prior studies for not seriously investigat-
ing the determinants of citations, the difficulty of identifying the true mean-
ing of many or few citations is so endemic that to our minds it calls into
question the entire enterprise.
II. OPPORTUNITY REGRESSIONS AND RESIDUAL RANKINGS
A raw citation count has several shortcomings as a measure of an arti-
cle's impact or quality. The number of citations an article receives is obvi-
ously related to how many chances it has had to be cited. Thus, recent
scholarship is penalized in compilations of most-cited articles. 3 Con-
versely, older pieces are less likely to have few citations because they have
had so many more opportunities to be cited.
It is, however, possible at least conceptually to compare the relative qual-
ity of articles that have had different opportunities to be cited. We can re-
gress total citations on variables that are correlated with the opportunities
the article has had to be cited but are not correlated with its quality. The
amount of time an article has been in print is the purest such variable, since
time correlates positively with opportunity but is (much more) independent
of an article's quality. The residuals of such an opportunity regression can
then be used to rank the relative quality of different articles. These rankings
crucially assume that, controlling for opportunities to be cited, better arti-
cles will be cited more often. 4 Articles with actual citations greater than
predicted citations (that is, those with positive residuals) are likely to be
3 This is not a new observation. For example, Landes and Posner used simple regression
analysis to predict total expected citations of the articles on one most-cited list. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 2. Our first regression mirrors theirs, except that we measure article age
in months rather than years. See equation (1) infra.
4 This of course will not always be true. See text around note 11 supra (discussing why
few citations are stronger evidence of relative quality than many).
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better than articles that lie below the opportunity regression line (that is,
those with negative residuals).
To correct for the effect of article age, we estimated a loglinear regres-
sion predicting net total citations 5 based on age and age squared, 6 then
ranked articles by standardized residuals. 7 The regression took the follow-
ing form:' 8
ln(total citations) = -10.459 + 5.245 X ln(months) (1)
- 0.497 X [ln(months)] 2.
In this equation, the standardized residual of an article represents the differ-
ence (in standard deviations) between actual citations and the number of
citations predicted for articles published in that month. In other words, the
residual is the margin above or below the expectation for articles of the
same age. Table 1 reports the five most-cited and five least-cited articles
corrected in this way for time since publication. 9
Table 1 underscores two possible additions to the opportunity regression.
Criminal law and labor law each account for two of the bottom five articles
listed. Conversely, the top of the list is heavy with discrimination law and
legal theory articles. This suggests that, as we hypothesized above, subject
area plays an important role in which articles get cited. Many more articles
are written each year in constitutional law than in tax law, for example, so
constitutional law pieces have many more opportunities to be cited. Thus,
comparing constitutional law and taxation articles on the same scale is argu-
ably unfair.2' The second observation relates to the representation of the dif-
'" We subtracted self-citations from gross total citations to obtain net total citations on the
theory that self-citations do not reflect article quality. Hereinafter, we use "total citations"
to refer to net total citations.
16 Adding a "cubed age of article" variable to our regression models did not affect any
of the results reported in Tables 1 and 2.
" Three articles received zero total citations. Because it is impossible to take a logarithm
of zero, we added one divided by the sample size (1/530) to the total citations of every obser-
vation before converting to natural logs.
" All of the coefficients were significant at p < 0.01. The coefficients on ln(months) and
[ln(months)] 2 imply that net citations increased quickest in early years then reached a maxi-
mum at 16.32 years.
9 Several commentators have expressed horror about our publishing a list of least-cited
articles. To demonstrate our good faith and to defray possible stigma, we note that a piece
by one of the coauthors appeared near the bottom of the list: Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel,
A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 987 (1994), appeared
among the least-cited 10 percent of articles ranked by standardized residuals. Even worse,
self-citations to this article actually exceeded citations by other authors (three versus two).
20 The effects of size of a field on citations is perhaps ambiguous. More opportunities to
be cited may also mean more competition for citations. See Landes, Lessig, & Solimine,
supra note 5, at 323 (noting a comparable phenomenon in the context of judicial citations).
In a particular subject area, articles in very elite law reviews have a competitive edge over
other articles, so we think the opportunity effect will dominate the competition effect in our
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TABLE 1
ToP FIVE AND BOTTOM FIVE ARTICLES RANKED BY STANDARDIZED RESIDUALS -
AGE OF ARTICLE REGRESSION
Number of
Rank Citations Reference
1 309 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev.
317 (1987)
2 297 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981)
3 262 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983)
4 192 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 581 (1990)
5 259 Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
781 (1983)
527 (tie) 1 George P. Fletcher, Mainfest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and
the Metamorphosis of Lloyd Weinreb, 90 Yale L. J. 319
(1980)
527 (tie) 1 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and
the "Metamorphosis of Larceny," 90 Yale L. J. 294 (1980)
528 0 Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 Yale L. J.
881 (1995)
529 0 Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of
Employees, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 87 (1993)
530 0 Benjamin Aaron, Unfair Labor Practices and the Right to
Strike in the Public Sector: Has the National Labor Rela-
tions Act Been a Good Model? 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1097
(1986)
ferent journals on the list. Harvard Law Review includes three of the top
five articles and none of the bottom five. Harvard has a larger readership
than Stanford or Yale. For either prestige or distribution reasons, an article
in Harvard may have received more citations than the same article would
have received if it had appeared in one of the other two journals.
An alternative ranking would correct for subject area and journal effects.
To this end, we generated journal dummy variables and a matrix of 13 sub-
ject area dummy variables.21 Adding these variables to equation (1) signifi-
data. The observed regression coefficients are consistent with this hypothesis. See Table 3
infra.
21 We generated two other opportunity variables: the first was equal to the sum of articles
in each of the Wilson Index to Legal Periodicals subject areas (up to six) listed for each
article, and the second was equal to the total number of articles in the SSCI database pub-
lished in years after the article. The variables actually reduced the adjusted R2 when added
to equation (1), and neither obtained statistical significance, so we omit them from subse-
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TABLE 2
Top FIVE AND BoTToM FIVE ARTICLES RANKED BY RESIDUALS -
AGE OF ARTICLE, JOURNAL, AND SUBJECT REGRESSION
Number of
Rank Citations Reference
1 240 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985)
2 309 Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconcious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317
(1987)
3 80 Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807
(1993)
4 158 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
Yale L. J. 1131 (1991)
5 297 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981)
526 (tie) 1 George P. Fletcher, Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and the
Metamorphosis of Lloyd Weinreb, 90 Yale L. J. 319 (1980)
526 (tie) 1 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Manifest Criminality, Criminal Intent, and
the "Metamorphosis of Larceny," 90 Yale L. J. 294 (1980)
527 2 Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal
Protection, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1211 (1985)
528 0 Zohar Goshen, Shareholder Dividend Options, 104 Yale L. J.
881 (1995)
529 0 Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of
Employees, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 87 (1993)
530 0 Benjamin Aaron, Unfair Labor Practices and the Right to Strike
in the Public Sector: Has the National Labor Relations Act
Been a Good Model? 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1097 (1986)
cantly altered the results (see Table 2). For example, Cass Sunstein's article
moves from off the most-cited list all the way to the top. The article bene-
fited by appearing in Stanford, where expected citations (15.62) were sig-
nificantly lower than in Harvard (26.58) or Yale (20.15)22 and by being
classified in the public law subject area, where articles had significantly
fewer expected citations than the mean (17.87 versus 20.07).23 At the other
quent analysis. We attribute the failure of these variables to the vagaries of Wilson classifica-
tion and collinearity with age, respectively.
22 P = 0.000 and p = 0.033, respectively. The reported values are derived from multi-
plying the regression coefficients by the mean values of the nonjournal variables, adding the
appropriate journal coefficient, then converting from logarithms.
23 P = 0.017. The other subject area dummies with statistically significant effects were
criminal law (18.48 expected citations, p = 0.072), discrimination (36.57, p = 0.054), inter-
national law (14.86, p = 0.016), jurisprudence (45.36, p = 0.000), and feminism or Critical
Legal Studies (CLS) (42.92, p = 0.059). (Recall that 20.07 citations is the mean.) A complete
discussion of the determinants of citations is reserved for the next section. See Section III
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end of the distribution, a Harvard article drops into the bottom five, attrib-
utable in part to the much higher expected citation count for articles in that
law review.24
There is at least one very important criticism of our approach.25 The jour-
nal and subject dummies may not be truly independent of article quality.
To the extent the Harvard effect is attributable to higher average article
quality rather than wider circulation or readership, it is problematic to in-
clude the journal dummies. To do so is to hold articles to a higher standard
precisely because they were of high enough quality to appear in the top law
review-an unfair ratcheting up. The same criticism could apply to the sub-
ject dummies. It may be that constitutional law articles are of higher aver-
age quality than international law articles. If this were true, allowing for
higher expected citations for constitutional law articles would constitute an
unfair penalty with respect to international law. Once we go beyond con-
trolling for age,26 it becomes difficult to identify variables that correlate
with opportunity but that are independent of quality.
III. DETERMINANTS OF CITATIONS
The previous section reported citation rankings adjusted for the opportu-
nities an article had to be cited. The opportunity variables included months
infra. Our ranking of the least-cited articles is not robust to alternative subject matter defini-
tions and/or aggregations. For example, it may be that feminist history articles are cited sub-
stantially less than feminist theory articles. If this were true, the level of aggregation that we
used would unfairly predict higher numbers of citations for all feminism pieces and therefore
estimate a negative residual for feminist history articles.
24 The article by Harper and Lupu was also penalized for being classified as a discrimina-
tion article, among which expected citations were higher than the average. The phrase
"Equal Protection" in the title accounts for this classification, but the article is fundamen-
tally about labor law. More broadly, we readily concede that article attributes distinct from
quality may have pushed the other five articles to the bottom of Tables 1 and 2. Goshen was
a lecturer at Hebrew University, so the lack of citations to his article could, for example,
represent reader bias against foreigners. The Weinreb article is a 25-page response to a book
by Fletcher, and Fletcher's article is a 30-page rebuttal. The Aaron article appeared in a labor
law symposium and spans a mere 26 pages. Wonnell's article is the third in labor law among
the bottom six. This overrepresentation suggests fewer opportunities for labor law articles to
be cited-perhaps a separate labor law dummy should have been included in the model.
25 There are at least two other ways to control for time since publication: (1) by grouping
articles by the year published and (2) by limiting citation counts to a constant number of
years since publication. We explored the second methodology but rejected it when some of
the overall most-cited articles appeared on the list of articles cited least in the first 4 years
after publication. For example, Robert Cover's 1983 Harvard foreword received 262 total
citations by 1997 but none until 1989. This extreme case cautions against drawing strong
conclusions of low impact for relatively young articles (like the Goshen and Wonnell articles
in Tables I and 2). Receiving few citations early on may be evidence that an article was
"ahead of its time."
' While it seems less plausible that the quality of articles has varied systematically over
the time period studied, even the age and age-squared variables are at least potentially subject
to this objection.
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since publication, journal, and subject area. In this section, we explore the
effects of other article and author characteristics on observed citations. Be-
fore reporting our results, a methodological point is in order. Citations in a
given year is the outcome variable in this section, rather than total citations
over the life span of the piece.27 This obviously has the effect of greatly
increasing the total number of observations. To exploit the panel structure
of our data, we estimated a loglinear AR(1) panel model,28 controlling for
a variety of other article and author effects.29 Estimating a panel model
made it possible to distinguish between citing year effects and the true ef-
fects of article age. A final advantage of this approach is that we can model
the flow of citations to a publication and test whether this pattern itself has
shifted over time. To our knowledge, this approach is novel in the analysis
of legal citations.
In fact, we find evidence of significant growth in the average number of
citations over time. Figure 1 reports the estimated median citations for the
years (from 1981 to 1997) in which the citations to a piece occurred.3° Espe-
cially in light of the fact that the model controlled for age of article when
cited, this result suggests that the SSCI database was larger in 1989 and
subsequent years. Including citing year dummy variables in our model de-
flates the observed effects of other variables for expansion of the SSCI data-
base.3 This is a less constrained opportunity correction than including vari-
ables for age and age squared.
An obvious determinant of citations in a particular year is the number of
years that have passed since the cited piece was published. After a lag pe-
riod for the article to be read and for other citing pieces to be published,
27 Unfortunately, we were not able to extract self-citations on a yearly basis from the SSCI
database. As a second-best solution, we deflated citations in each year using a multiplier
equal to (total gross citations - self-citations)/total gross citations.
2 This is a variety of generalized least squares (GLS) models, which use both cross-
section and time-series data. See William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis 485-88 (1990).
We experimented with fixed effects, random effects, unstructured correlation, and other aut-
oregressive panel models before settling on the AR(l) model. Because citations to an article
in adjacent years seem more closely correlated than citations between year 1 and year 5, for
example, an autoregressive model seemed the most appropriate, and the AR(1) model
achieved greater significance than AR(2). The magnitude and direction of the effects noted
in the text did not vary substantially between the random effects and autoregressive models.
Because most of our independent variables (author and article attributes) are time invariant,
it was impossible to estimate meaningfully a fixed effects regression. Our attempts to esti-
mate an unstructured correlation model failed to achieve convergence.
29 See Table 3 infra.
o The coefficients on the citation year dummies for every year after 1988 are positive and
statistically significant.
3' Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship, in this issue, at 517, similarly deflates
observed citations to correct for changes in the size of the database. See also Eisenberg &
Wells, supra note 3, at 385 (using a comparable deflator equal to the number of documents
citing Laurence Tribe or Richard Posner).
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FIGURE 1.-Predicted median citations by citing year
we hypothesize that recent scholarship will be cited more than older work.
Recent articles are more likely to be timely. Original ideas-which are pre-
sumably what these three elite journals publish-spread across legal schol-
arship, so that the original piece must compete for citations with more sub-
stitute pieces as time passes. If this hypothesis were true, we would expect
to see citations per year rise quickly in the first few years after publication,
crest, then ebb in subsequent years. Controlling for numerous article and
author attributes, we observe exactly this pattern in median citations (see
Figure 2).32 Citations to a piece peaked 4 years after its publication, de-
clined, then flattened out.33 A simple tabulation reveals that half of total ci-
tations for all articles occurred before the articles were 4.61 years old.34
This suggests that doubling citations about 41/2 years after an article has
32 Although the coefficients are not reported in Table 3, the regression model also included
dummy variables for the number of years that elapsed between publication and an observed
citation. From the coefficients on these variables we estimated the median citations depicted
in Table 2.
11 The flat distribution after year 7 is puzzling-one would expect citations to diminish to
the right of the maximum. This pattern may be attributable to the growth of the SSCI data-
base. See notes 29-30 and accompanying text supra. Because age of publication when cited
and citing year are so highly correlated, including citing year dummy variables may not suf-
ficiently correct for the expanded coverage of SSCI. Possible deficiencies aside, the observed
flow of citations tells an interesting story about the impact of legal scholarship over time.
' An alternative methodology relies on the coefficients reported in equation (1). With a
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FIGuRE 2.-Predicted median citations in a given year by age of article
been published would give an estimate of how many citations the article
will receive over its life span.
In addition to time variables, we examine over 50 other article attributes.
Many interesting findings emerge. Harvard's advantage over Stanford and
Yale disappears when citations are corrected for the other variables. The
issue variables were not statistically significant, so the data do not support
our hypothesis that articles appearing in issues filled during the traditional
early spring and early fall submission waves would have been of higher
quality (and garnered more citations) because they were drawn from a
larger pool. The first piece in an issue received 108 percent more citations
than pieces appearing fourth or later (p = 0.013). 3' To provide a sense of
the substantive significance of this effect and the others reported below, the
mean number of citations per year for the citation years included in Table
3 was 3.64 citations (the median value was one). Appearing second in issue
was a marginally significant advantage (p = 0.087).36
Turning to subject effects, articles in the areas of jurisprudence and femi-
nism or Critical Legal Studies (CLS) received significantly more than the
average number of citations. The 78 percent bonus for articles in feminism
and CLS was the largest positive effect. In contrast, international law and
criminal law articles received significantly fewer citations than the aver-
" Coefficients in a loglinear regression represent the percentage effect of each variable on
the average predicted outcome.
36 See text around Table 4 infra for interpretation of the order-in-issue effect.
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age.37 Among other article attributes, Harvard forewords were not signifi-
cantly more cited than other articles. Coauthored articles were cited more
frequently than single-author pieces, but pieces with more than two authors
suffered a large penalty. Reporting an equation reduced average citations
by an estimated 131 percent (p = 0.001). Articles with figures did 48 per-
cent better than average, whereas articles with appendices did 50 percent
worse than average; both effects were marginally significant. The signifi-
cant negative coefficients on the footnotes-per-page variables suggest that
articles with fewer footnotes were cited more frequently than articles with
more footnotes, holding number of pages constant.
Characteristics of the author also played a significant role in determining
citations. White female authors received 57 percent more citations than
white men (the omitted category) (p = 0.038). Articles by minority women
were the most heavily cited, with 164 percent more citations than articles
by white men (p = 0.011). In a separate regression, we tested the hypothe-
sis that citations to articles by minority authors increased after Richard Del-
gado's widely publicized article in 1984, which accused nonminority au-
thors of discriminating against articles by minorities.38 We constructed a
dummy variable equal to one for pieces by minority scholars cited in years
after 1984. There was no statistically significant evidence of increased cita-
tion to minority-authored articles after 1984.
Authors in the youngest quartile of the distribution (below 36 years of
age) received significantly more citations than authors in the omitted
quartile (ages 41-46). The first six variables characterizing the employment
status of authors suggest the following ranking of authors from highest to
lowest average citations: judges, full professors, associate professors,39 as-
sistant professors, and attorneys. However, the lack of statistical signifi-
cance on these variables tells a more important story than the relative size
of the coefficients. This is at least weak evidence that law review editors
did not systematically favor work by full professors.
The next set of variables were designed to test for nepotism in the law
review selection process. The "local tenure piece" variable is equal to one
for associate professors publishing at the law journal where they teach. The
observed negative coefficient on this variable supports the hypothesis that
" It should be noted that each piece was allowed more than one subject classification. For
example, Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 19, was classified in criminal law, discrimination,
and economics.
3" See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984).
'9 Harvard Law School does not have untenured associate professors, so we classified as
"associate professors" Harvard assistant professors with more than 3 years teaching experi-
ence when their article was published. Our aim was to capture plausible tenure candidates.
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tenure pieces are accepted by the home journal at a relatively low quality
cutoff. However, the result is not statistically significant. The negative but
insignificant coefficient on the "visited school of journal" variable tells a
similar story with respect to favoritism toward visiting professors. The vari-
able "at school of journal" is equal to one for pieces with at least one au-
thor who was a teacher at the law school where the piece was published.
For example, an essay by a Stanford professor in Stanford Law Review is
coded one. The next variable similarly captures law teachers who were vis-
iting professors at the school where the article was published within 3 years
prior to its publication. "At other top-three school" was designed to be
compared with the "at school of journal" variable and is equal to one for
professors at one of the other two schools who publish in the third school's
journal. For example, an article by a Yale professor published in Harvard
is one for this variable. Contrary to the nepotism hypothesis, there are no
significant differences among these coefficients, which vary from 0.46 to
0.67. Articles authored by professors at top-15 law schools were cited sig-
nificantly more than the articles by authors at lower ranked schools. Finally,
of all of our "prior author experience" variables, only prior membership
on law review was a marginally significant advantage.
Including Nonarticles. Next, we expanded the data set to include all non-
student-written work, excluding book reviews, tributes, and other very short
pieces. When reporting least-cited pieces, it seemed unfair to include es-
says, commentaries, symposium pieces, and the like. However, we believe
this type of scholarship is important and can give additional insight into the
determinants of citations." When nonarticles are included, the number of
observations increased to 9,529, reflecting 979 published pieces.
Many of the observed effects remain unchanged, but several interesting
differences emerge. The Stanford and Yale journal dummy coefficients
were negative and highly significant when nonarticles were considered.
This suggests that Harvard's prestige may derive not from better articles
but, rather, from higher quality (or simply fewer) shorter pieces. In addition
to the same subject area effects as noted above, articles in constitutional
law and the legal profession received significantly more citations, whereas
public law pieces received significantly fewer than the average. The pages
coefficient is significantly positive and the pages-squared coefficient sig-
nificantly negative, with magnitudes implying increasing citations through-
out the relevant range of pages but declining citations per page after page
53. Articles with shorter titles received significantly more citations than ar-
ticles with longer titles. The Delgado effect is in the predicted direction-
' Indeed, the mean citations to nonarticles was 16.42 citations. This is not a trivial figure,
even though it is well below the 37.25 mean for articles. Moreover, 26 nonarticles earned
more than 50 citations each.
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that is, more citations to pieces by minorities after 1984-but falls short of
statistical significance (p = 0.137). Finally, former United States Supreme
Court clerks received significantly more citations than average, and authors
admitted to the bar received significantly fewer.
Changes over Time. Using year-specific citations data allows us to test
for changes over time in the determinants of citations. (Again, we limit the
analysis to articles only in order to avoid complications like a higher pro-
portion of nonarticles in more recent years.) To test the null hypothesis that
the flow pattern was constant across time, we generated 168 dummy vari-
ables for the interactions between the age of the article when cited and the
year of publication. Including these variables in a regression model allows
a different intercept for each unique pair of publication year and citing year.
For example, articles published in 1985 are allowed a unique predicted cita-
tion average for the year 1990. These interaction variables are jointly sig-
nificant at p = 0.000 (chi-squared test), suggesting that the pattern observed
in Figure 2 varied significantly across publication years.
Especially given this finding on citation flows, it makes sense to consider
whether the effects of other variables have changed over time. With this
goal in mind, we constructed a dummy variable equal to one for citing years
after 1990 and interacted it with the variables in the regression underlying
Table 3.4 As above, this more constrained model reveals that the flow of
citations after 1990 was significantly different than in earlier years. The null
hypothesis that the age by post-1990 interaction variables are all equal to
zero is rejected at p = 0.000 (chi-squared test). From the signs on the coef-
ficients, it appears that citations peaked earlier in the more recent period.
The effects of several article and author attributes are significantly differ-
ent in the period since 1990. None of the subject area interaction coeffi-
cents, however, were statistically significant.42 Harvard forewords received
4 We generated interaction terms for every variable with two exceptions: the citing year
dummies and the age-of-article dummies greater than seven. (Because our data cover only
citations through the first part of 1997, this last set of dummies is equal to zero for articles
published after 1989.)
42 There is obviously more than one way to analyze subject area trends. Robert Ellickson,
for example, has examined changes over time in the percentage of articles that use particular
words. See Ellickson, supra note 31, at 517. We constructed a set of five dummy variables
for articles using the phrases "transactions costs" or "Coase," "critical race theory" or
"critical legal studies," "feminism," "table 1," and "civic republicanism." (Because West-
law had complete coverage for our three journals only since November 1982, we had to
drop 1,211 observations.) In a separate post-1990 interaction model (omitting our original set
of subject variables and the "table" variable), we observe a significant positive coefficient
on the post-1990 interaction with the Coase variables, suggesting increased impact in later
years for scholarship in areas associated with these buzzwords. Indeed, Coasian articles were
significantly more cited than others in the later time period. Civic republican articles received
substantially more citations in the later period than in the earlier period, but neither the
change over time nor the difference from the median was statistically significant. Feminist
articles received significantly higher average citations in both time periods. For CLS or Criti-
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fewer citations than other articles in the earlier time period, but more cita-
tions in later years, and the increase was marginally significant (p = 0.053).
Associate and assistant professors received fewer citations than other au-
thors in the earlier period. However, both classes of authors did signifi-
cantly better after 1990. Full professors also gained relative to other au-
thors, suggesting a general rise in citations for articles by legal academics.
The effect of the "local tenure piece" variable after 1990 was negative and
statistically significant (p = 0.047), consistent with the nepotism hypothe-
sis. In the earlier period, however, the coefficient was positive but just shy
of marginal statistical significance (p = 0.106). Being at a top-15 law
school had no significant effect on citations in the earlier time period, but
these authors fared significantly better after 1990. This suggests that the
payoff to prestige or the quality of elite faculty was higher in later years.
Finally, the law review advantage noted above was significant only in the
post-1990 period.
IV. DETERMINANTS OF LEAST-CITED ARTICLES
This article began with the premise that the least-cited articles in the Har-
vard, Stanford, and Yale law reviews are likely to be of poor quality. The
previous section explored the effects of various article and author attributes
in estimating citations per year for all articles. In this section, we turn our
attention back to the least-cited articles and examine whether the same vari-
ables predict which articles were likely to fall into the bottom 10 percent
of the citation distribution.
Rather than use raw citation counts, we corrected for months since publi-
cation, journal, and subject area effects using the opportunity regression un-
derlying Table 2. We constructed a dichotomous outcome variable equal to
one for articles that fell into the bottom 10 percent of articles ranked by
standardized residuals. Next, we estimated a logistic regression model pre-
dicting this outcome variable based on the panoply of independent variables
listed in Table 3. Unfortunately, we were forced to return to simple cross-
sectional analysis since the outcome variable takes on the same value in
every citing year period. This reduced sample size to 441 observations,
which greatly weakened the statistical power of the model. The pseudo-R
2
cal Race Theory (CRT) articles, none of the observed coefficients were significant. (For this
combined variable, the rise of CRT probably compensated for the widely recognized decline
of CLS. See Ellickson, supra.) Finally, articles with "table 1" received significantly more
citations than other articles but only in the post-1990 period. Compare William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J. Law &
Econ. 385 (1993) (concluding that law and economics was growing through 1980s and that
its growth exceeded that of political theory, CLS, and feminist legal theory).
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of the regression was 0.2438, but only a handful of coefficients were statis-
tically significant.
The Stanford and Yale coefficients were -0.947 and -0.968, respec-
tively, and the latter was marginally significant (p = 0.089). These coeffi-
cients correspond to odds ratios of 0.388 for Stanford and 0.379 for Yale.
Because we constructed the outcome variable based on residuals from a re-
gression equation that allowed for journal intercept shifts, these coefficients
can be best understood as measuring the variance (not mean) of citations.
The negative coefficients suggest that articles in the Stanford and Yale law
journals had lower variance in citations, such that fewer of them fell below
the 10 percent threshold. None of the issue effects were statistically sig-
nificant, but the first-in-issue coefficient of - 1.855 came close atp = 0.104
(odds ratio = 0.156). Similarly, only the international law subject coeffi-
cient, at 1.272, bordered on statistical significance (odds ratio = 3.568; p =
0.110). As with journal effects, because we previously corrected for differ-
ences in mean citations across subject areas, this result is best understood
as showing that international law articles have a higher than average vari-
ance in total citations. Having a colon in the title significantly reduced the
probability of falling into the bottom 10 percent (odds ratio = 0.363; p =
0.083). Turning to author characteristics, articles by women were signifi-
cantly less likely to be among the least cited (odds ratio = 0.253; p =
0.032). Last, former law review members produced articles that were about
one-third as likely as others to earn citation residuals at the bottom of the
distribution (odds ratio = 0.361; p = 0.020).
V. THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
In the introduction we alluded to the fundamental problem that our re-
sults are subject to multiple causal interpretations. We proposed three alter-
native explanations for observing a positive relationship between an article
or author attribute and citation counts: (1) quality-articles with that attri-
bute were of higher than average quality; (2) editor bias-law review edi-
tors required a higher minimum quality to publish (that is, discriminated
against) that type of article; and (3) citing bias-subsequent scholars dis-
criminated in favor of citing articles with this attribute in ways unrelated to
the article's intrinsic quality.43 At various points in our previous discussion,
we tried to foreground particular explanations. For example, with regard to
our discussion of the "local tenure piece" variable, we tried to interpret the
" The least-cited regression results are subject to all of these interpretations plus the possi-
bility that the results relate to variance in citation rates. For example, the finding that having
a colon significantly reduced the likelihood of an article falling into the least-cited decile
might indicate merely that such articles have a lower variance in citation.
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negative coefficient as evidence of nepotism (a form of editor bias). Now
we step back to consider whether-given the identification problem-it is
possible to distinguish among alternative causal stories.
To see the problem more concretely, consider our finding in Table 3 that
articles by white women received 47 percent more citations than articles by
white men. This finding could have at least three different causes. First, edi-
tors may be biased against articles by women-setting a higher quality
threshold for their acceptance. Second, editors may set the same quality
threshold for both male- and female-authored articles but, conditional on
being above this threshold, the articles by women were of higher average
quality. Third, if we relax the assumption that the number of citations re-
flects the intrinsic quality of the article, then readers might cite female-
authored articles more not because of their higher quality but for some other
reason. For example, citing authors might, as a theoretical matter, discrimi-
nate against articles by men. The category of "citing bias" encompasses a
wide variety of criteria that differ from an article's quality. To provide an-
other illustration, international law articles may be cited substantially less
frequently than other articles because there are fewer opportunities each
year for these articles to be cited (at least in the SSCI database).
Some progress, however, can be made in distinguishing among causal
stories. An analysis of order-in-issue effects helps to distinguish between
citing bias and the other two effects.' By interacting the order variables
with a dummy variable equal to one if the articles in the issue were ar-
ranged nonalphabetically, we can distinguish the effect of higher readership
due simply to appearing first from the effect of higher quality as manifested
by the editors' decision to eschew alphabetical order to give a higher qual-
ity article priority. 4" When we modified the panel model regression reported
in Table 3 to include new interaction variables, we found the order effects
shown in Table 4. The coefficients suggest that alphabetized articles ap-
pearing first received 108 percent more citations than articles placed fourth
or later. Since alphabetized article order is not systematically related to arti-
cle quality, this positive and statistically significant coefficient is suggestive
of citing bias. The first article has a billboard effect that gives it greater
opportunities to be cited. The data suggest that appearing first (or second) in
the issue-quite apart from editor prioritization-boosted expected median
44 Our analysis of issue order is inspired by Scott Smart & Joel Waldfogel, A Citation-
Based Test for Discrimination at Economics and Finance Journals (Working Paper No.
W5460, Nat'l Bureau Econ. Res. 1996).
" Of course, editors' quality judgments would be expected sometimes to coincide with
straight alphabetical ordering. Without knowing more about the law review's ordering poli-
cies, however, we use nonalphabetical ordering as an admittedly underinclusive proxy for
ordering based on perceived article quality.
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TABLE 4
ORDER-IN-ISSUE EFFECTS -ARTICLES-ONLY REGRESSION
Coefficient p-Value
Variable:
First in issue 1.079 .013
Second in issue .756 .087
Third in issue .407 .487
First and nonalphabetic .262 .288
Second and nonalphabetic .326 .242
Third and nonalphabetic -. 229 .718
X 2  p-Value
Difference:
Alphabetical issues:
First - second 2.250 .133
First - third 2.300 .129
Second - third .610 .436
Nonalphabetical issues:
First - second .750 .386
First - third 4.570 .033
Second - third 3.020 .083
NoTE.-Observations = 5,431; N = 530.
citations. But the regression also suggests that nonalphabetized articles ap-
pearing first were likely to be cited even more-a full 134 percent more
than articles appearing fourth or later. Within nonalphabetical issues, lead
articles received significantly more citations than articles placed third (p =
0.033; chi-squared), which was not true for alphabetical issues. This sug-
gests that, independent of any billboard effect, editors' choices of prioritiza-
tion coincided with subsequent scholars' decisions of which articles to cite.
This is at least consistent with the quality interpretation. Without being able
to identify those issues in which alphabetical order happened to coincide
with editors' quality judgments, it is impossible to estimate precisely the
relative impact of each effect, but the data provide strong support for both
interpretations.
Editor Bias. Editorial placement decisions may also be influenced by
bias against certain categories of authors. For example, editors may system-
atically place inferior articles by men ahead of better articles by women.
We also tested for bias against minorities, bias in favor of authors at the
school of the journal, and bias in favor of authors at one of the top three
law schools. To do so, we generated variables for the interactions between
article placement and the characteristics of interest.' We know that first-
' To ensure that we were focusing on issues in which editors made discretionary place-
ment decisions, we limited the data set to first and second articles in nonalphabetically ar-
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placed articles generally receive more citations than articles appearing later.
Thus, if female-authored articles placed second receive more citations than
male-authored articles placed first, this would suggest that editors discrimi-
nated against women in their decisions on which articles to publish first in
an issue. In fact, there was no evidence of either sexism or racism in place-
ment decisions. The nepotism and elitism effects were actually the reverse
of what we predicted: first-placed articles by outsiders and nonelite authors
received fewer citations than second-placed articles by insiders and elite au-
thors.47 However, neither effect was statistically significant. This suggests
that in placing articles law review editors may have favored authors who
did not teach at the school of the journal or at the top three law schools
generally.
Second, we tested the hypothesis that the top executive of a journal in-
fluenced acceptance decisions to favor articles by authors of his or her own
racial or gender status.48 To this end, we constructed three new interaction
variables: female executive X female author, Asian executive X minority
author, and black executive X minority author.49 Negative coefficients on
these variables would suggest a lower quality cutoff for articles written by
authors with demographic characteristics matching the journal's executive.
In fact, none of the interactions achieved statistical significance. The coef-
ficient on the black interaction variable was, however, large and negative
(-1.36), consistent with the favoritism hypothesis.
VI. CONCLUSION
There may be a strong temptation to read many of our results as recipes
for citation success. Authors (or law review editors) might think that they
could increase their citations if they just publish longer articles or shift to-
ward publishing constitutional law pieces. Such inferences are fraught with
peril. The fallacy of aggregation suggests that just because long articles
have tended to be cited more in the past does not mean that journals should
force authors to add 10 pages of pablum to their articles in order to generate
ranged issues with two or more articles. The result was 1,440 yearly observations for 121
articles.
4' All of our findings here are consistent with those of Smart & Waldfogel, supra note 44,
which examined the same types of bias in the placement of articles in economics journals.
41 We use the generic term "executive" to refer to the editor-in-chief at Yale and the
president at Harvard. The authors thank William Birdthistle, former managing editor of the
Harvard Law Review, for gathering the data on presidents. Data for Stanford were unavail-
able.
41 We subdivided executives into Asian and black on the basis of initial cross tabulations,
which suggested differences between the two groups. Our sample included three black, four
Asian, and eight female executives.
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more citations. Still, with regard to an individual article, it is hard to resist
thinking that affixing a shorter title might not increase the number of cita-
tions.5 °
Citations analysis also unavoidably has a gossipy and at times tawdry
aspect. We are drawn to citation rankings-reading and discussing them
around the water cooler-but we are simultaneously repulsed by them-
criticizing their meanings (especially when we are excluded). Given the en-
demic identification problems discussed above, extreme modesty is in or-
der. Indeed, while there is a certain ineffable value to these studies, we
wonder whether this value justifies the time and journal pages devoted to
the subject.5
APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
Our source of citations data was the SSCI, compiled by the Institute for Scientific
Information. We extracted citation, self-citation, and citation by citing year counts
for every piece in the Harvard, Stanford, and Yale law reviews. The electronic ver-
sion of the SSCI we used covered the period from 1980 to 1997, with only partial
coverage in the first and last years. We used all of this citing information but limited
the scope of cited pieces to the period from 1980 to the 1994-95 volume of each
journal. Next, we examined in hard copy each piece on the list to determine how
the journal classified it. We eliminated student-written work (notes, book notes,
case notes, developments in the law, and so forth), tributes, correspondence, and
book reviews. The remaining pieces included all articles, essays, commentaries,
Harvard forewords, and symposium pieces. In order to a maintain a minimal degree
of comparability among the pieces, we also eliminated all pieces with fewer than
five pages and pieces shorter than 10 pages with no citations. In the end we were
left with a total sample size of 979 pieces, including 530 articles.
From the hard copies of the pieces we created most of the article and author
characteristic variables listed in Table 3. The professor, associate professor, assis-
tant professor, judge, attorney, and age variables reflect the characteristics of the
first author. For coauthored pieces, the other author indicator variables were also
coded one if any of the coauthors satisfied the relevant criterion. The dagger notes
were the primary source of these data. We also relied on the American Association
of Law Schools (AALS) Directory of Law Teachers in each year from 1980 to 1995
to augment (and in some cases to create) the variables for visiting professor, local
50 But if there were a general decline in the length of titles, even this effect might vanish.
The general point is related to the Lucas critique of macroeconomic empiricism. Just because
one observes that in the past the unemployment rate has declined when the money supply
increases does not mean that the government can confidently manipulate the money supply
in order to decrease unemployment. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Econometric Policy Evaluation:
A Critique, in The Phillips Curve and Labor Markets 19 (Karl Brunner & Allan H. Meltzer
eds., Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy No. 1, 1976).
5' Compare J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People,
71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 843 (1996).
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VARIABLE MEANS (and Standard Deviations for




Total citations 38.8 47.0
Self-citations 1.5 2.2
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Second in issue .332
Third in issue .064
First and nonalphabetic .113
Second and nonalphabetic .115
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Local tenure piece .075
At school of journal .289
Visited school of journal .053
At other top-three school .074
At top-four to top-15 school .277
Prior experience:
Degree from school of journal .311
Ph.D. .162
On law review .594
U.S. Supreme Court clerk .242
Admitted to the bar .847
NOTE.-See note 42 supra for an explanation of the subject variables in
quotation marks. N = 530.
tenure piece, Ph.D., law school attended, law review, United States Supreme Court
clerk, and bar admission. The AALS Directory obviously covers only law teachers,
and it is incomplete with respect to many of these variables, so we supplemented
the data using the Martindale-Hubbell directories available in LEXIS and various
directories of the judiciary. Nonetheless, many of these variables had to be coded
as missing. We generated a set of dummy variables equal to one for missing obser-
vations, then recoded the missing values as zero. (We included this set of dummy
variables in all analyses that included author characteristic dummies to retain these
observations without biasing the results, but we do not report them because they
are by definition impossible to interpret.)
The subject area variables were constructed differently. We linked our data to
the Wilson Index to Legal Periodicals to obtain the Wilson subject codes (up to
six) for each piece. These codes form the basis of our 13 subject area dummies.
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Arbitrary grouping decisions were to a certain extent unavoidable. In addition, we
searched (manually and electronically) titles and Wilson codes for key words asso-
ciated with each of our subject areas. An alternative set of five subject area vari-
ables was calculated using a different methodology, which is described above. 52 For
the 530 articles, Table Al reports mean values for the variables of interest.
52 See note 41 supra.
